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CHAPTER 5
CHOOSING NORMS TO PROMOTE
COMPLIANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS: THE
CASE FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
BENCHMARK STANDARDS
by Richard W. Parker
As the number of international environmental agreements
(IEAs) continues to mount' so too does the continuing destruction of
the environment by mankind. Notwithstanding the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), endangered
mammals continue to be taken and traded at alarming rates.2
Notwithstanding the Biodiversity Convention, the global heritage of
biodiversity continues to be reduced at the estimated rate of 50,000
species per year and the impact of the Biodiversity Convention on
that trend has, so far, not been detectable.3 Notwithstanding the
enumeration of countless fisheries conservation agreements, many
of the fish stocks of the world are reported on the brink of collapse.4
Notwithstanding the Framework Convention on Climate Change,
greenhouse gas emissions continue to spiral upward and it appears
probable that all but two of the industrialized countries will fail to
fulfill their aggregate greenhouse gas emissions commitments for the
year 2000.5 Although the Basel Convention on Transboundary
Movement of Hazardous Waste expresses the aim of both restricting
trade in waste and limiting generation of waste at the source, its
success in restricting trade is undetermined and generation of
hazardous waste continues to mount worldwide.6 Even the hitherto
highly successful Montreal Protocol on Protection of the Ozone Layer
is threatened by the rise of a massive global black market, i.e., non-
compliance at the private level, that clearly challenges the integrity
of the regime and so far has not been answered by any effective
enforcement response.
While few would deny that a number of IEAs have made
important contributions to global environmental protection, their
mixed record of accomplishment, their uncertain future, and the
troubling juxtaposition of accumulating agreements and mounting
harm have summoned forth new inquiries into the external
conditions, and strategies of regime design, that promote or hinder
compliance and effectiveness.'
Meanwhile the majority of nations, particularly developing
countries, find themselves burdened with "local" problems that
acutely threaten life and livelihood within their own borders: e.g.,
urban air pollution, toxic waste exposure, contaminated drinking
water, soil erosion and desertification. Twenty-five years after the
1972 Stockholm Declaration affirmed the right of governments to
address these problems autonomously, it is clear that the complexity
and diversity of environmental problems have overwhelmed the
resources of most national environmental ministries. While IEA
conferences clamor for participation, the burden of trying to cope
with acute, and often life threatening, local problems distracts and
deters many countries from participating fully in collective efforts to
protect the global commons. The question arises whether
international coordination has anything to offer countries grappling
with these "local" (within-country) threats, at least those challenges
that confront many countries in common.9
In thinking about these questions, we begin with the observation
that many environmental harms do not arise from the activities of
states -at [east not from states.acting in their sovereign capacity.
Rather, they arise from the activities of private actors and state
enterprises (hereafter "private sector") who design, produce, or use
goods or dispose of waste products. Norm specification therefore
takes place at both the international and national levels; so does
compliance oversight. Moreover, it often happens that the
environmental harm results from a product or activity that cannot
simply be banned completely, because the product or activity is
useful. The challenge is to win governmental and private sector
acceptance of an alternative or modified product or process that
provides the same (or similar) economic benefit with reduced
environmental impact. In this situation, and it is a very common one,
we can discern at least three possible models for environmental
policy coordination: (1) no international coordination; (2)
commitments to limit aggregate impacts (or transboundary impacts)
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arising within each country's jurisdiction, with no specification of
implementing policies for particular products, processes or activities;
and (3) harmonization or convergence of specific national policies to
control specific environmental impacts arising from identified
products, production processes, or waste disposal practices. These
three models will be labeled, respectively: autonomy; aggregate
goals; and international standards. "o They differ, obviously, in the
degree to which they decentralize decision-making, and in the
balance they strike between greatei flexibility and autonomy, on one
hand, and greater specificity and directedness on the other.
The choice among these models may seem technical; but the
implications are fundamental. As one author pithily put it, "regime
design matters";11 so do ideas about how regimes should be designed
and about whether they have any business addressing particular
problems at all. When the international community decides, as by
and large it has, that the autonomy or no-coordination model is the
best approach to addressing local harms, that decision has vast
ramifications for "local" environmental protection worldwide. At the
global level, when the drafters of the Climate Change Convention
adopted the aggregate goals approach in 1992-capping aggregate
emissions of greenhouse gases while rejecting internationally agreed
standards or incentives for particular products or processes, they
adopted the only approach that possibly could have yielded
agreement in time for the Rio Conference. But can policymakers
continue that approach-without ever coordinating sectoral
policies-and hope for compliance or effectiveness long-term? We will
see there is reason to doubt they can.
This chapter examines how this fundamental choice of control
strategy-no coordination, aggregate goals, and standards-is
reflected in current thinking and in the practice of states and
international environmental regimes. It seeks to contribute to the
emerging debate over how policymakers ought to approach this
crucial choice.
The first part examines traditional doctrine and practice.
Though more empirical research is needed, it appears that
international standards for products or production processes have
been used in a primary role in some IEAs addressing transboundary
and global harms; that variants of the standards concept has served
in a secondary role in others; and that certain important IEAs, e.g.,
the Climate Change and Biodiversity Conventions, do not use
standards at all. The latter agreements adopt the aggregate goals
model. Meanwhile, in the context of local (within-country) harms, the
autonomy model reigns virtually supreme. International product and
especially production process standards are seldom used and, in fact,
confront a categorical presumption against their use.12
The second part will call this presumption into question and
make the conceptual case for wider deployment of international
standards, which I will loosely refer to as "benchmark" standards,
applied to both transboundary and local harms. The term benchmark
standard will be used broadly in this chapter to include any standard
or economic incentive keyed to the environmental performance of
products, p:roduction process, or waste disposal practice. The concept
thus includes command-and-control regulations. It also includes
baseline allocations of marketable permits, and/or internationally
agreed structures of economic incentives such as taxes and charges.
The defining element of a standard is not the method of regulation
chosen, but the fact that a method is chosen and applied to identified
products, processes and activities." Although benchmark standards
as proposed would be "nonbinding" on governments, it is anticipated
that standards adopted and implemented by national governments
would be fully binding on their respective private sectors. The second
part will show that competitive impacts, the traditional foundation
of arguments for international standards, comprise one but only one
factor in the analysis. The fundamental contribution of international
standards to regime effectiveness lies in their ability to supplement
scarce national resources in standards-development and
enforcement; their potential for building compliance-enhancing
"epistemic" networks among government officials, industry leaders,
and environmental NGOs; their contribution to promoting technology
transfer, expanding markets and generating cost-saving learning
curves and economies of scale for clean technologies; their
conduciveness to public-private mechanisms of compliance oversight
that can leverage the woefully inadequate enforcement resources of
most environmental ministries; and, in particular cases where
competitive impacts matter, the ability of international standards to
help establish what is perceived as a more or less "level playing
field," as reassurance to those who fear that adopting effective
environmental measures without international coordination will
cause domestic producers to suffer unwarranted competitive harm.
While standards have these advantages, they also suffer from a
number of potential drawbacks. The third part will address some of
the arguments that have been levied against the international
standards model: that such standards are inherently "Procrustean"
and overlook the fundamental diversity of national circumstances
and preferences; that international standards might lower rather
than raise levels of environmental protection; that international
standards will not be complied with or be effective unless they are
enforced by trade sanctions which are themselves unacceptable; and
that development of such standards would be excessively
cumbersome and unwieldy.
The last part will sketch out a model for the development and
implementation of nonbinding, substantive international standards
or incentives for improving environmental performance of particular
products, production processes or other activities. My purpose in
offering a model is both to imagine a workable process for developing
standards that is representative and meets the criticisms outlined
above; and to demonstrate that many of the criticisms of anti-
standards advocates are criticisms of stereotypically "bad" standard
setting. They are not, and need not be taken as, criticisms of
international standard setting per se. It will be seen that the model
proposed is innovative but not radically new in concept; indeed, it
represents a logical culmination of recent trends in public-private
standard setting and compliance oversight.
An overview of the argument may help the reader as we proceed.
We will see that the reigning presumption against the standards
model for products and (especially) production processes rests on
three problemmatic assumptions. First, it assumes that states have
the technical and institutional capacity to develop cost-effective
environmental standards for products and processes on their own,
and to enforce them. Second, it assumes that circumstances and
preferences of nations vary so widely that uniform or even tiered
performance standards would be economically inefficient and
environmentally ineffective. Third, it assumes that competitive
disadvantages arising from differential regulation of particular
products or processes are negligible and/or irrelevant to policy in all
important cases.
None of these assumptions is tenable, at least not as a
categorical proposition. Effective environmental regulation is an
enormously complex undertaking which frequently occurs at the
frontiers of technical and scientific knowledge. Regulators in many
countries, particularly developing countries, find themselves forced
to address local and global environmental problems with fledgling
agencies, few technical resources and even less political clout. Such
agencies are likely to lack the expertise needed to properly assess the
risks and formulate cost-effective environmental standards for
products and activities under their jurisdiction. They may lack the
domestic institutional and legal infrastructure effectively to monitor
and enforce the standards they have promulgated. In some cases,
they may have to grapple with fears (founded or otherwise) that
effective, but unilateral, environmental regulation will place their
domestic producers at a competitive disadvantage in world markets,
and trigger a political backlash. And it may or may not be the case
that other regulators in other countries are facing similar challenges
from similar products, activities, or production processes.
My purpose at this point is not to assert that international
process standards should be developed and applied in all cases; on
the contrary, there undoubtedly are regulatory scenarios in which
decentralized regulation is the optimal response and this chapter will
briefly consider how such situations might be identified. My purpose
is simply to call into question the presumption against international
standards that has crept, or is creeping, into current thinking, and
to suggest the benefits of a case-by-case empirical analysis of these
issues in particular regulatory contexts. When it comes to
international standards, there should be, in Esty's words, a
"presumption against presumptions."' 4
I would emphasize that this chapter represents a preliminary
analysis and an agenda for further research. Much remains to be
explored; there is a particular need for in-depth scholarly study of
the specific achievements and failures of standards-type approaches
in those environmental regimes where they have been used. I will
indicate as I go along those additional areas where further research
is likely to be fruitful.
The Role of Standards in Current Practice and Doctrine
The most obvious examples of international product and process
standard-setting can be found in European Union (EU) environ-
mental regulations and directives, and much could be learned from
reviewing the EU experience in this field. Ultimately, however, the
EU experience must be considered sui generis: the EU embraces a
much greater degree of economic and political integration than is
acceptable to most countries outside the union. This section
accordingly will focus on the role of international standards in other
contexts.
Although an overview of the 900 or so IEAs lies well outside our
scope, this section will review the way standards or analogous
instruments are used, or not used, in a few of the more prominent
international accords that address harm arising from products or
production processes, and it will document the rarity of international
standards addressing purely local harms. This section also will
examine the doctrinal underpinnings of current practice, revealing
(1) an implicit pragmatic preference for aggregate goal approaches
in IEAs addressing harms arising from numerous and diverse
sources; and (2) a categorical presumption against international
coordination, and especially against use of process standards, in
responding to local harms.
Standards in the Context of Transboundary and Global
Impacts
IEAs addressing transboundary and global harms from products
or production processes employ three broad approaches to standards.
Some employ standards as their primary substantive rule. A second
group employs aggregate limits on impacts (or transboundary
impacts) from national activities, supplemented by "guidelines" for
product or process design. A third group does not make use of
standards or guidelines at all. IEAs in the third group (including the
climate change convention) rely exclusively on norms keyed to
aggregate national performance.
IEAs Using International Standards as the Primary
Operative Norm
Perhaps the most striking examples of international product and
process standards are to be found in high seas fisheries regimes,
which commonly employ such measures as gear restrictions, catch
limits, by-catch limits, and practice requirements in the effort to
conserve marine resources. A few examples may be given. The Inter-
American Tropical Tuna Commission has established a declining
schedule of limits on permissible dolphin kill rates (a production
process standard) in the eastern tropical Pacific tuna fishery. These
standards have been extremely successful in reducing incidental
dolphin mortality in the eastern tropical Pacific tuna fishery, with
mortality levels down from over 130,000 per year in 1987 to less than
5,000 in 1995.15 Likewise, three UN General Assembly resolutions on
high seas driftnet fishing have proscribed use of driftnets in excess
of a given length on the high seas (another international production
process standard).16 These are technically "nonbinding" although
they are enforced by unilateral trade sanctions under the U.S. Pelly
Amendment. They are believed to have been effective in curbing the
use of very large driftnets, although this is only one small part of the
high seas fishery conservation dilemma.
The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Hazardous Waste and Their Disposal (Basel Convention) also
embraces a "standard" for waste export activities. It requires that
specified procedures be followed and conditions met before individual
shipments of hazardous waste may be exported. A more recent
amendment simply bans exports of hazardous waste from OECD
countries to non-OECD countries. 7
The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution by
Ships (MAIRPOL) has relied on standards for both tanker operations
and tanker design to achieve quite significant reductions in ship-
based discharges of oil at sea."
The Convention for the Protection of the Rhine River Against
Pollution by Chemical Pollution requires each Contracting Party to
inventory its sources of named pollutants, and to apply to each
source the quantitative emissions standards developed for that
pollutant and source by the International Commission for the
Protection of the Rhine Against Pollution. 9
The Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against
Pollution from Land-Based Sources provides for a ban on discharges
of "black list" substances and strict limits on discharges of "gray list"
substances. It also calls for "common emissions standards" on gray
list substances listed in annex I to the Protocol, but the provision
proved controversial and to date it appears that only eight such
standards have been developed. Preliminary research does not reveal
their level of specificity or whether they have been implemented.°
Standards and Guidelines Used to Supplement Aggregate
Norms
A number of IEAs do not use standards for products or private
actions as their primary operative rule, but do make use of them in
an ancillary mode. For example, the Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP Convention) and its protocols
principally limit national aggregate emissions of acid-rain causing
compounds. But these aggregate limits are supplemented by a series
of product- or process-specific standards. For example, the Nitrogen
Oxides Protocol commits the parties to, e.g., "apply national
emissions standards to major new stationary sources and/or source
categories [of nitrogen oxides], and to substantially modified
stationary .sources... based on best available technologies which are
economically feasible taking into consideration the Technical
Annex."21
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Similarly, the international stratospheric ozone regime relies
principally on a series of aggregate national phase-out commitments
for the production and consumption of specified ozone-depleting
substances (OD S). 22 However, the regime has also made effective use
on occasion of "proto-benchmark standards" in the form of
international guidance documents and reports.23 Pursuant to Article
6 of the Montreal Protocol, the parties have established a Technical
and Economic Assessment Panel (TEAP) and seven Technical
Options Committees (TOCs) focused principally on the generation
and analysis of available alternatives to ODS in a wide variety of
specific applications. These seldom-studied TOCs appear to be
playing a crucial role in the forward movement of the ozone regime.
For example, the methyl bromide TOC, convened in 1993, produced
a very influential group of case studies identifying non-ODS
alternatives to four critical uses of methyl bromide-cut flowers,
tomatoes, strawberries, and cucurbits-drawing on research
sponsored by a variety of institutions around the world. The control
options identified in the report would, if implemented, allow a 25
percent reduction in methyl bromide emissions by 2001 and a
complete phase-out by 2010 of methyl bromide uses in developed,
and largely temperate climate, countries.24 This report has been
praised as "critically influential in convincing parties to the Montreal
Protocol that methyl bromide alternatives were available in key use
areas.
' 25
Regimes that Do Not Use Standards at All
Many IEAs do not employ standards for products, processes or
activities and could not be expected to do so. For instance, some
instruments, such as the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of
International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, require
only actions by states (setting aside wetlands) which do not require
conforming private behavior for accomplishing regime goals. 6 Other
agreements simply seek to ban certain activities, like the taking or
trade of endangered species, rather than regulate them. "7 Other
agreements establish an international liability rule, without seeking
directly to regulate either aggregate national or individual impacts.2"
The standards model is not directly applicable in such contexts.
Little purpose would be served by reciting all the various
situations where standards are not employed because they are not
applicable to the regulatory situation. This section will focus on two
very important situations where environmental harms arise as an
incident to the use of products or production processes and where
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standards approaches might have been used-in either a primary or
supplementary mode-but were not.
The first example is the Biodiversity Convention. 29
Deforestation, a principal culprit in biodiversity loss, clearly arises
from productive activities-agriculture and forestry-that are
susceptible to regulation. Yet the Biodiversity Convention does not
make use of forestry standards; in fact, it states no verifiable norms
of any kind. Predictably, it has had no detectable impact on the rate
of biodiversity loss worldwide. Nonetheless, a form of "standard" may
be emerging under separate auspices, and holds the potential of
making a significant contribution to reducing biodiversity loss
arising from unsustainable forestry. The Forest Stewardship Council
(FSC)-a consortium of environmental NGOs and wood trade
organizations, subsidized by the Austrian government and
headquartered in Mexico City-has developed criteria and guidelines
for certifying forests as "sustainably managed."30 It is too soon to say
whether or how widely adopted the guidelines will be, or whether
they will have a major impact on behavior. But the work of the FSC
is interesting as a demonstration that industry and environmental
groups can reach consensus on responsible environmental practice
even in relatively contentious areas.
Likewise, the Framework Convention on Climate Change
(FCCC) ha:s rejected, so far, the adoption of benchmark standards or
even proto-standards of the kind supplied by the ozone technical
options committees. Like the ozone treaty, the climate change
convention adopts the approach of seeking national aggregate
commitments for emissions reductions, rather than coordinated
product- or process-specific performance targets, e.g., targets for
energy use in particular steel production processes, or standards for
methane emissions from pipelines.3 Like the ozone treaty, the
climate change convention provides for subsidiary bodies-in this
case a "Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice" and
an Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)-which are
charged with, among other things, analyzing and disseminating
promising technology options for reducing GHG emissions. Unlike
the ozone treaty, however, the climate change parties have not used
these bodies to develop "proto-standards." At the most recent
conference of parties in Geneva (July 1996), the IPCC proposed to set
up intergovernmental technical advisory panels to evaluate the
technical and market potential of current and emerging technologies.
However, the proposal was blocked and the advisory panels were not
established.3 2
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Notwithstanding the U.S. position in Geneva, there is evidence
that the lack of relevant national or international standards may be
impeding progress. It now appears that all but two industrialized
countries will miss their aggregate emissions targets for the year
2000. Yet an EPA analysis found that "institutional change" in the
United States could yield greenhouse gas reductions of up to 21
percent below 1990 levels with a positive GDP impact of 0.5 percent.
Another study has identified an "efficiency gap"-a disparity between
actual and economically feasible levels of energy efficiency-of 14-30
percent. Why are money-saving options for energy conservation being
passed over? The explanation offered by these studies is that
individual and corporate consumers simply are not aware of cost-
effective sources of energy savings. The same is true, no doubt,
world-wide. If these analyses are correct, it would appear that
widespread adoption of benchmark standards to require low-cost
energy savings in identified uses could achieve dramatic energy
savings at a tiny fraction of the cost required to achieve the same
results through energy taxes (even if such taxes could be enacted). 33
Much could be learned from a comparative study of all the IEAs
reviewed above, focusing on the process by which benchmark
standards have been developed, their substantive level of rigor and
specificity, the number of countries adopting the standard, their
compliance oversight mechanism, and their overall record of
compliance and effectiveness. Has the specification of relatively
precise performance standards and reporting requirements promoted
complying behavior? To the extent that benchmark standards were
called for, but never developed, why not? To my knowledge, no such
study now exists.
As Applied to Local Harms
Outside the European Union, there are essentially no binding
international standards addressed to the prevention of local harms
and even nonbinding instruments are few and far between. The
Codex Alimentarius has published a set of nonbinding guidelines for
pesticide residues on food (i.e., product standards), which nations
may apply both domestically and also to imported food. Although
particular Codex standards have been criticized as too weak and
have been trumped by stricter standards in some countries, 4 many
other Codex standards have been widely adopted in advanced
industrial and developing countries alike.
UNEP has developed a group of nonbinding practice guidelines
aimed at guiding national efforts to control local harms, including
well-known guidelines on drinking water quality, on technologies
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and techniques for limiting environmental impacts from a variery of
production practices,35 and guidelines for environmentally sound
waste management practices.36 Preliminary research does not
indicate whether, or to what degree, UNEP's guidelines for
environmentally sound management of hazardous waste have been
incorporated into national practice. Further research is needed on
the track record of these guidelines in the area of implementation,
compliance and effectiveness.
Apart from the Codex standards and UNEP guidelines, inter-
governmental standards initiatives addressed to local harms have
largely been confined to "pre-standards" harmonization, i.e.,
international collaboration in the analysis of risk but not in the
choice of final standard. For example, the OECD has developed a set
of standardized protocols on good laboratory practices and methods
for chemical testing and risk assessment in support of national
standard setting.37 These methodological standards clearly are non-
substantive and hence do not fill the shoes of true substantive
standards. But they do suggest a new and fruitful line of inquiry:
what is the actual, and optimal, role of pre-standard harmonization,
e.g., harmonization of analytical and test methodologies in the global
regime of environmental protection?
While governments avoid international standards aimed at local
harms, the public remains concerned about the environmental
impact abroad of the products they consume. In response to this
public demand, industry associations such as the Chemical
Manufacturers Association (CMA) and the American Petroleum
Institute (API) have developed codes of conduct to which members
(most of whom are multinational corporations) must swear allegiance
as a condition of membership. They apply to the members' operations
worldwide. However, these private codes are not of a substantive
nature and a recent study (which did not receive much publicity) has
reported that less than 20 percent of the surveyed firms said they
followed the CIA guidelines.3" These findings support a common
sense skepticism of multinational corporate claims (never verified)
that their overseas operations meet the same environmental
standards as their facilities in the home country. And they suggest
that nonbinding accords at the international level must be made
binding on domestic actors in order to be effective.
As Roht-Arriaza's chapter points out, private sector standard-
setting is also proceeding in the International Standards
Organization (ISO) and other fora. ISO's "Environmental
Management System" and the EU's Eco-Management and Audit
Scheme (EMAS) both require that companies wishing to be ISO or
EMAS certified, respectively, must install business management
structures and procedures that are thought to be conducive to
improved environmental performance.39 These are not substantive
standards. They do not actually require improved environmental
performance or establish criteria for judging whether a product's or
facility's environmental performance is adequate. It will be seen,
however, that these emerging management standards offer a useful
model for environmental compliance oversight. If widely adopted
they may themselves create a vitally useful monitoring and reporting
infrastructure upon which a regime of substantive standards might
be built.
One group of non-governmental or quasi-governmental
initiatives does try to establish substantive performance criteria for
controlling local as well as transboundary harms. A fledgling group
of eco-labeling programs have developed or are developing
substantive criteria which address all major environmental impacts
from the full life-cycle-production, use, disposal-of products
subject to the standard. They have generated a firestorm of
controversy for doing so, with industry and developing country
representatives arguing that local impacts arising from the
production process are of no legitimate concern to consumers in
other, importing countries. In many ways the environmental
performance criteria employed by these eco-labeling schemes can be
seen as analogous to benchmark standards and much can be learned
from their experience." However, the analogy is inexact. Eco-labeling
criteria are not minimum criteria, but rather "top of the line" criteria
which intentionally exclude all but the best producers,
environmentally. These eco-label schemes do not invite balanced
participation in criteria development; they so far have precluded any
variation or tiering of standards (as commonly practiced in domestic
standards programs) to accommodate the different requirements of
different ecosystems. They raise issues of aggregation-how to
''score" one impact against another in awarding an overall scale of
approval-that simply do not arise in a standards context. Unlike
the case of true standards, moreover, participation in these eco-label
schemes is completely voluntary at the private sector level. Both their
producer participation rate and their impact on consumer purchasing
behavior remains unclear at this time.
The preceding discussion makes clear that benchmark
standards, or rough equivalents thereof, are present on the stage of
international environmental protection, but their role is not well
understood and appears to be quite limited. They are employed in a
few IEAs, adverted to in a limited and general form in a few others,
and avoided altogether in several of the most important JEAs, such
as the climate change and biodiversity conventions. The latter
instruments leave nations largely on their own to implement
appropriate national standards or incentives, aided by whatever
technical or financial assistance they can procure from public or
private donors. We have also seen that substantive, international
standards to control local harms are virtually non-existent, although
we find no shortage of second cousins to the concept. The question
arises, what thinking and doctrine underlies this result?
Current Doctrine On Appropriate Models of Cooperation
We begin our doctrinal analysis with the language of Principle
2 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which is
thought to embody customary law. It provides that
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign
right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental and developmental policies, and the
responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction do not cause damage to the environment of other
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.41
States thus have a duty to cooperate with respect to transboundary
and global harms, and no duty to cooperate with respect to local
impacts.
The matter is not quite as simple as that, however. The question
of what sort of impact is "local impact" and what is transboundary
can lead to depths of scientific complexity.4 2 Duty to cooperate is,
moreover, only a starting point for analysis. A duty to cooperate with
respect to transboundary harms does not indicate what form this
cooperation should take. Nor does a lack of legal duty to cooperate in
respect of local harms tell us much about whether voluntary
cooperation, in particular cases, would be a good thing-improving
environmental outcomes and promoting sustainable development at
equal or less cost than would obtain in the absence of coordination.
Duty and good policy simply are not co-extensive.
What is good policy with regard to international cooperation,
according to prevailing doctrine? In the context of transboundary and
global harms, it is widely agreed that cooperation of some sort is not
only required but desirable, and that it may take the form of a
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product- or process-specific standard if such an approach is readily
available. In practice, it turns out that standards approaches have
been used only in regulatory situations where the harm addressed by
an international instrument is the product of a single
product/activity or a very narrow range of products/activities, i.e., the
ban on large-scale high seas driftnet fishing, or the limit on dolphin
mortality in the eastern tropical Pacific purse seine tuna fishery.
Where numerous or diverse sources are involved, as in the climate
change convention, the aggregate goals approach is preferred.
Aggregate caps are easier to negotiate in a short time frame than
product or process-specific standards from different categories of
sources. And nations understandably value the policy flexibility built
into an aggregate commitments model. We will shortly consider
whether these advantages are purchased at too high a price.
While current doctrine acknowledges standards approaches to
transboundary environmental problems (in principle and sometimes
in practice), opinion and doctrine is set against the use of
international standards to address local harms. Here, the analysis
of economists and trade lawyers has largely prevailed to date.
International environmental standards are written off as
economically inefficient, environmentally ineffective and conducive
to trade protectionism.
The economist William Nordhaus has stated the economic
objection to international standards succinctly as a "Fundamental
Result":
For local environmental problems, under competitive
conditions, efficiency requires that countries should not
harmonize their environmental policies. Countries should
determine their policies by balancing local marginal costs and
benefits. The resulting efficient standards or emissions fees
will generally be different in different countries ... Efforts to
harmonize policies for local environmental problems will lead
to a decline in potential economic welfare.43
Similar sentiments have been expressed by other economists, such
as Bhagwati, Srinivasan, and Leebron;44 and feature regularly in the
statements of national delegates to various international fora, and
in reports issuing from such fora.' 5 This view holds not only that
states should not be coerced into accepting international standards,
but that international standards for localized impacts are in
principle a bad idea.
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The free trade community is slightly more qualified in its
opposition to standards, but only slightly. International product
standards--i.e., standards related to the design and characteristics
of products.-are encouraged under the rules of the new World Trade
Organization (WTO). Indeed, WTO creates a rebuttable presumption
in favor of :international product standards including, presumably,
environmental standards, wherever such standards exist.46 But the
presumption applies only for the purpose of judging the
permissibility of national restrictions on imports or exports of
products moving in international trade. In this limited context,
where international standards for product design apply to goods
made in one country and used in another, the harm in question is
really a form of transboundary harm: the source of the harm (product
design) occurs in one country, while the impact (via use of the
product) falls in another. By and large, therefore, economists and
trade lawyers agree that international standards applied to truly
local harms are presumed a bad idea.
The next section calls this presumption into question as a matter
of environmental policy, making the case for greater openness to
international application of product- or process-specifc performance
standards to address both local and transboundary environmental
impacts.
The Case for Benchmark Standards
Every knowledgeable person accepts by now that physical
externalities-transboundary pollution or depletion/destruction of
the global commons-require and warrant international cooperation,
at least if the harm is reasonably significant and certain.47 But what
kind of cooperation is appropriate? And what sort of coordination, if
any, is appropriate in response to purely local harms? In considering
these questions, benchmark standards offer four advantages that
merit more attention than they have received to date.
First, benchmark standards minimize the burden on national
capacity for standard-setting and compliance oversight. They do this
because they are expressed in a form that can apply directly to the
products or activities that cause environmental harm, and thus
correspond to the policy instruments that all environmental
ministries employ, and must employ, in order to implement broad
IEA commitments or address local environmental challenges. Also,
benchmark standards, properly designed, are readily monitorable
and directly verifiable at the level of particular products or facilities.
Compliance with benchmark standards can be supervised not only
by government inspectors but by internationally accredited auditors,
following procedures similar to those now in use by the International
Standards Organization. By enhancing national capacity to regulate,
benchmark standards enable countries to achieve environmental
objectives jointly that they could not achieve alone. Benchmark
standards may be seen in this light for what they really are:
a sovereignty-enhancing mechanism by which governments
as a group could more effectively regulate private actors as
a group.4"
A second advantage of benchmark standards, though related to
the first, is more speculative. It derives from the fact that benchmark
standards provide an opportunity for a process that brings all
elements of the compliance community-scientists, policymakers and
industry/NGO representatives-together for a common dialogue.
Such a dialogue-if it can be maintained on a constructive footing--
creates an opportunity for building "epistemic networks" that
promote consensus on standards, and greater compliance thereafter.
Thus, in the course of building capacity to comply with IEAs or
protect the local environment, benchmark standards can also
mobilize the political will to do so-under the right circumstances.
A third advantage of benchmark standards is that, if widely
adopted, they offer a more level playing field to producers in those
instances where strict national standards would inflict competitive
injury on national producers in the absence of an international
standard. In such instances, international benchmark standards can
reduce both the economic cost and the political difficulty of policies
needed to cost-effectively address both local and transboundary
harms. A final advantage of benchmark standards is that they
potentially expand markets for clean production and/or clean-up
technologies, promoting economies of scale and technical learning
that reduce compliance costs for regulated industries.
This part will discuss the nature and significance of each of
these advantages.
National Capacity
National capacity is a concept that does not fit neatly into
economists' models. It refers to the technical competence of
environmental regulators to estimate and fully understand
environmental risks, to assess the availability and cost of risk-
avoiding technologies and techniques, to promulgate cost-effective
rules and regulations to reduce risk (preserving where possible the
economic gains from the underlying activities at issue) and to ensure
compliance with the rules thus promulgated. Capacity limitations in
economists' parlance are a "transactions cost" that is difficult for
theories to accommodate and thus is all too easily forgotten.
Nordhaus' passing reference to "under competitive conditions"
and to balancing "local marginal costs and benefits" in his
"fundamental theorem," for example, allows him, as much of his
profession, to simply assume that all environmental costs are fully
internalized, to assume that "local marginal costs and benefits" are,
or can easily be, balanced in any and all cases; and thereby to
conclude what his assumptions firmly establish: that harmonization
of local-harcm standards serves no valid purpose.4" Reality is
otherwise. Although further research would be needed to document
in detail the actual staff size, training, and budget of environmental
ministries in other countries (hard data on foreign environmental
ministries is difficult to find and quantitatively measuring "capacity"
is no easy task), there appears no reasonable question that many
developing countries, and even a number of OECD countries, have
small, technically unsophisticated and politically weak
environmental ministries. Their staffs are under-trained in relation
to the technical challenges facing them, and under-paid in relation
to the temptations facing them. Governmental inspection and
enforcement capacity will remain inadequate for the foreseeable
future, creating serious problems of compliance-assurance with
respect to both national and international standards. 5' To be sure,
technical assistance programs have been created on a multilateral
and bilateral basis. But few would maintain that existing programs
show promise of removing, within the forseeable future, the serious
deficit of standard-setting and enforcement capacity that hampers
environmental protection worldwide. Limited capacity is and will
remain a fact of life in many countries.
Impact On Local Standards
The implications of severely limited national capacity are
profound. Cost-effective environmental protection requires a host of
highly technical and complex analyses both as to the level and nature
of the risk and as to the availability (or prospective availability) and
cost of various control options. Although these decisions contain an
important "value" component, e.g., how much extra cost can a
pollution control option impose and still be acceptable, they are
calculations with an irreducible technical core that require
significant scientific and technical expertise.
To put the matter in perspective, the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has a staff of over 17,000
and an operating budget of over $2 billion. It is the largest and most
sophisticated environmental ministry in the world. Yet EPA cannot
meet its statutory deadlines for performing risk assessments and for
drafting standards to address various environmental risks from
various products and/or production processes. Furthermore, the
standards EPA has developed have frequently been criticized as
"unscientific," commercially infeasible or otherwise flawed. The
remedy invariably proposed for these defects is yet more analysis, for
which EPA is given no additional resources. If this is the plight of
overworked and understaffed EPA, despite a $2 billion operating
budget, imagine the situation of environmental ministries in
developing countries or smaller industrialized countries.
Under circumstances of severely constrained national capacity
for informed decision-making and effective compliance-oversight, the
foreseeable consequence of complete, unguided national autonomy in
standard setting and enforcement is not the nicely-tailored and
nuanced body of standards-each country internalizing environ-
mental costs in keeping with local tastes and conditions-so blithely
assumed in the models of classical economists such as Nordhaus and
Bhagwati. The consequence may well be no standards; or standards
that are merely imported from other, dissimilar countries without
knowledge or conviction of their appropriateness; and/or unrealistic
standards that are not enforced or intended to be enforced. This
same lack of capacity also has ramifications for IEAs addressing
global and transboundary harms in broad aggregate terms.
Impact on Commitments to Remedy Global/Transboundary
Harms
IEA effectiveness requires that a sufficient number of nations
adhere to sufficiently rigorous commitments. Nations will be wary of
undertaking ambitious commitments expressed in broad aggregate
terms when they have no clear idea of the product- or process-
specific measures or the related costs necessary to comply with such
measures. This, once again, requires a highly complex analysis of the
products and processes giving rise to the harm, the technologies and
mitigation options that are available, the present cost of those
options and the prospects for new technologies offering improved
environmental performance. The analysis must be undertaken and
translated into a cost-effective standard or emissions fee for each
product or production process that needs to be controlled. Such an
undertaking, when added to the local responsibilities of the agency,
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may well exceed the fairly limited technical and administrative
capacity of many environmental ministries. And if the experience of
the ozone and climate change treaties is any guide, international
resource transfers under current IEA arrangements are not likely to
fill the gap.!1
Certainly, discussion of control options and costs can occur under
either an aggregate commitments or a benchmark standards
approach. I3ut under the former approach-in the absence of
benchmark standards or a credible process leading up to them-the
exploration of control options and costs tends to be sidelined, back-
channeled, and unstructured. Quality assurance is absent and risk
of error or exaggeration in this context is high. Compliance costs
associated with standards are hard to measure and even harder to
predict. They often appear large initially, then decline rapidly as new
pollution reduction technologies and know-how come on line.
Producers invariably offer worst-case estimates of compliance costs
in the norm formation stage in order to avoid or minimize regulatory
requirements. Environmental groups likewise may tend to
exaggerate risks in order to increase the pressure for action. In the
absence of a structured and balanced dialogue yielding a balanced
picture of current and foreseeable compliance options and costs, it
should not be surprising if national delegates and regulators are
confused, and tend to err on the side of economic caution.
A well.designed benchmark standards process will yield a
structured, quality-assured examination of the costs and benefits of
possible standards or taxes. It will amplify national capacity by
drawing into the standard-setting process an array of private sector
expertise and resources offering a full range of data and analysis to
guide decision-making. And it will generate vitally important
regulatory efficiencies. When countries face certain challenges in
common and those challenges are complex, why should each separate
ministry re-invent the wheel?
Impact of Benchmark Standards on IEA Compliance
IEA effectiveness requires not only strong commitments by
countries, it also requires faithful implementation and diligent
enforcement against private sector actors. National enforcement
capacity in many countries is at least as problematic as standard-
setting capacity. In a context of limited governmental enforcement
capacity, benchmark standards are valuable in that they articulate
norms in a format that is measurable, readily monitored and
verified. Furthermore, as recent developments in private standard
setting demonstrate (see the Roht-Arriaza chapter in this volume),
product or facility level benchmark standards could be monitored by
auditors and verified by internationally-accredited registrars, easing
the governmental enforcement burden. Moreover, when a violation
of product- or process-specific benchmark standard is established,
the proper response is immediately apparent. Breach of an aggregate
national commitment, e.g., cap on total GHG emissions, by contrast,
is difficult to establish and yields no clear policy remedy.
Epistemic Communities and Political Will
The capacity to understand environmental risks and options for
controlling them is not the same thing as the will to take appropriate
action. To what extent can benchmark standards, either by the
process of their formation or their existence, promote political will to
address particular environmental harms through effective policies?
In a valuable study of the Mediterranean Action Plan, Peter
Haas has demonstrated that national environmental preferences are
not necessarily static. He shows how members of a transnational
scientific "epistemic community" focused attention of governmental
policymakers on the risks and harms arising from marine pollution,
and thereby mobilized international consensus for a coordinated
program to clean up the Mediterranean. 52 In essence, they persuaded
policymakers to re-calculate their national interest in ways that
reflected the benefits of cleaner Mediterranean waters.S
Haas's study also indicates, however, that international
emissions standards, though recognized as essential by European
delegates, proved highly controversial and were deferred to a later
date.54 Indeed, developing country delegates were reluctant to enter
into generalized commitments to ban discharges of certain wastes
because, in Haas's words, "LDC delegates were generally unaware
of the actual chemical composition of their industrial waste ... , 55
If so, it would appear that the "epistemic community" contributing
to the development of the "Med Plan" did not include experts
knowledgeable of the production processes involved, the available or
foreseeable control options applicable to those processes, or the
emissions standards achievable by those control options. Any such
knowledge gap surely would have made LDC delegates not only
reluctant to accept emissions standards on particular kinds of
facilities, but reluctant to accept any controls on certain pollutants
for fear of the unknown costs involved. 6
This is an issue which merits further study in the context of the
Med Plan and more generally. Would enlargement of the epistemic
community to include experts knowledgeable of production processes
165
and control options facilitate consensus on suitable emissions
standards? 'Would greater appreciation of the availability and cost of
various control options facilitate acceptance of more ambitious
general commitments? Or would it produce deeper gridlock?
Competitiveness
The debate over international standards has traditionally
ignored all of the considerations outlined above. It has focused
instead on competitiveness concerns: the concern of environmental
advocates that, without harmonization of standards, industry
migration from high standard countries to low standard countries,
or the prospect of it, will create downward pressure on standards in
all countries except the dirtiest. At a minimum, it will produce
political drag on efforts to raise standards further in the higher
standard countries.
This narrow focus on competitiveness, pollution havens and race-
to-the-bottom fears has produced calls for international standards (or
extension of national standards) backed by trade sanctions against
non-conforming products or countries of origin. These proposals in
turn have galvanized vigorous opposition from free traders who fear
opening the door to a new round of trade restrictions.
Competitiveness-based harmonization proposals have also produced
an evidentiary and conceptual gridlock over the question of whether
divergent environmental requirements have competitiveness
impacts, and, if so, whether that matters.
Economists insist that there is no systematic evidence of
differential environmental regulation causing industrial migration
on any significant scale in the past; but they also acknowledge that
the data are inconclusive. 57 Besides the recognized limitations of the
data themselves, a seldom-mentioned but fundamental difficulty
confronts efforts to draw policy relevant conclusions from existing
data. Retrospective empirical studies do not take account of U.S.
laws and policies (and no doubt many other countries' laws or
policies) which instruct regulators or permit writers to design and
apply standards with a view to containing cost and, by implication,
competitiveness impacts.5 ' Thus, existing studies do not rule out the
possibility that widespread competitiveness impacts have not shown
up so far because they have been designed out the system by cost-
conscious regulators-at the expense of the environment. If so,
future efforts to achieve truly "sustainable production" in particular
sectors might very well produce encounter plausible and significant
competitiveness objections-if such measures impose higher costs
without international coordination.
5 9
There is anecdotal evidence that fears of future competitive
impacts from measures under consideration are already hampering
achievement of objectives in both the ozone and climate change
regimes. Ozone treaty parties have been lucky in that ODS-free
alternatives have been available for many applications at little or no
extra cost, thereby mooting competitiveness concerns while allowing
a simply phase-out (with identified essential use exemptions) of
nearly all use of ODS. The parties so far have not felt the need to
develop intermediate use standards allowing limited use; and they
have not faced strong competitiveness-based objections in moving
forward with a total phase-out of ODS in many applications. Methyl
bromide, however, is a major ODS of vital importance to agriculture
in both developed and developing countries. The competitiveness
impacts of denying methyl bromide use to producers in some but not
all countries could be severe, and vigorous resistance has arisen
within the U.S. agricultural community to any phase-out proposal
that fails to include developing country agricultural producers.6"
Those who maintain that competitiveness impacts never matter
should consider the case of methyl bromide.
Meanwhile, in the climate change regime, fears of
competitiveness loss stand athwart efforts to implement policies
needed to meet aggregate emissions reductions goals. A number of
European countries have been frustrated in their efforts to impose
substantial industrial-sector energy or carbon taxes in order to meet
their aggregate commitments because of industry fears that such
taxes will render them commercially uncompetitive-unless other
countries impose similar taxes or equivalent regulatory incentives.61
The United States is likely to fall short of its commitments thanks
largely to a pattern of denial in the Congress (and in the compliance
community) that is only partly based, if at all, on true appreciation
of scientific uncertainties surrounding the climate change
hypothesis. Stoking the fires of denial is a steady flow of industry
testimony to the effect that imposing energy taxes or other mandates
on energy-intensive U.S. industries such as steel will raise prices and
cost U.S. jobs by reducing U.S. industry competitiveness.62
The main point to emphasize is that the existence, or relevance,
of competitiveness impacts flowing from differential environmental
regulations cannot be meaningfully determined as a categorical
proposition, or on the basis of retrospective data. Such impacts are
fundamentally case-specific: they will vary according to the product
or process in question, the level and costliness of regulation or tax
that exists or is proposed, and numerous other market factors. What
is required is a case-by-case assessment of the impact of a current or
proposed regulation or incentive as applied to the product or process
in question.
Suppose an actual or prospective environmental standard is
shown to have potential competitive significance if adopted by some
but not all major- producers. Does that matter? It has been
argued-articulated most famously by Lawrence Summers's 1992
memo reported in the Economist-that differing standards may be
a good thing even if they result in the migration of dirty industries
to pollution havens.6 3 If other countries have ecosystems that are less
burdened or more robust, if they have a population that is more
dispersed or less likely to live to the age where latent cancers would
develop, then migration of dirty industry to such locales is, in
Summers's view, supported by "impeccable logic."
Suffice it to say that the logic of Summers's argument is
"impeccable" only if the environmental and health costs are fully
internalized in all countries. Yet the achievement of such
internalization cannot be assumed. That is precisely the purpose of
the proposed international standards regime, in respect of both local
and transboundary harms. In the real world of limited government
capacity that exists outside of economists' models, there is no reason
to suppose full cost internalization will happen automatically across
all countries acting in isolation.
In cases where prospective optimal taxes or regulations will
produce competitive shifts if higher standards are adopted by some
but not all. countries of origin, then the conceptual case for
benchmark standards is strong. To the extent they are widely
adopted they allow countries to elevate their standards without
imposing on their producers deadweight costs of compliance
associated with market share loss and production shifting to other
countries. However, these cases also produce incentives for other
countries to hold out on adopting benchmark standards in hopes of
winning a short-term competitive gain. This means that, in these
cases, nonbinding benchmark standards are not likely to be
universally adopted unless they are supported by material
inducements such as conditional financial aid, trade preferences for
joiners or threat of trade sanctions against holdouts. These are likely
to be forthcoming, if at all, only in the context of collective efforts to
address transboundary and global harms.
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Ironically, the situation most favorable to adoption of nonbinding
benchmark standards arises in the case where they have least often
been considered, and most often opposed: when addressing local or
global environmental harms through measures that can
implemented without major impact on competitiveness. It is in these
cases that technically proficient and procedurally credible
benchmark standards, though nonbinding, will have most appeal to
national governments. And it appears that there are surprisingly
many situations in this category. As seen, it has been estimated that
significant GHG emissions reductions could be achieved through
national measures that impose little or no net cost on producers. The
Business Council for Sustainable Development (BCSD) has made a
virtual gospel of the concept of "eco-efficiency":64 the idea that many
products and processes can be redesigned in ways that better the
environment while lowering producer costs.
An early application for benchmark standards, then, and a
fruitful area for further research, would be to identify these
situations, and formulate a credible process for developing
benchmark standards to exploit them.
Efficiency and Economies of Scale
The efficiency gains from international product and process
standards are obvious. Both offer economic efficiencies by expanding
markets for "green" products, clean production technologies and end-
of-pipe emissions control technologies. This would create both
learning curve benefits as well as economies of scale in production,
thereby lowering costs of compliance. Indeed, in some cases, it may
render control options feasible that would not be commercially
feasible otherwise.
There is some evidence that balkanization of state and national
process standards has already impaired and is continuing to impair
the commercialization of environmental technologies, rendering the
trade-off between environment and growth even more painful. Esty
reports the testimony of a California venture capitalist, Dag Syrrist,
to the effect that, in Esty's words, "[e]very year, hundreds of young
environmental companies with potentially important new pollution
control and prevention technologies fail to reach financial viability
and die on the vine because of a regulatory process that lets separate
environmental authorities [in different nations] force companies to
re-prove the effectiveness of their products. 65 More empirical
research is needed to test this proposition.
The Case Against Benchmark Standards: Overview and
Response
Despite the advantages of international environmental
standards reviewed above, the contrary view seems to have carried
the day thus far, especially with regard to production process (PPM)
standards. Therefore, it behooves us to pay careful attention to the
arguments supporting the contrary view.
Once again the arguments vary somewhat, according to whether
the impact in question is transboundary or local in nature. Broadly
speaking, the case against international process standards involves
allegations that such standards would: (1) infringe national
sovereignty; (2) inefficiently over-ride the fundamental diversity of
national circumstances; (3) risk downward harmonization of
standards; (4) require a lengthy and unwieldy process; and (5)
depend on unacceptable trade sanctions for effectiveness.
Loss of Sovereignty
The Rio Declaration, as we have seen, provides that "States
have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their
own resources pursuant to their own environmental and
developmental policies . 66 For many government officials the
single word "sovereignty" is the beginning, and often the end, of any
discussion of international standards addressed to local harms.67
Yet the argument is a red herring. Sovereignty concerns may
explain why countries resist unilateral imposition of one country's
national standards upon another. But they do not explain why
countries have not found it more often in their own self-interest to
agree on, and adopt, benchmark standards for environmental
performance. Explanation for the latter-beyond simple inattention
or apathy-must be found in the influence of a widely-shared belief
that international benchmark standards to address local harms are
economically inefficient and environmentally undesirable. The
veracity of that belief must be proved. To the extent that efficient
and cost-effective standards can be designed through collaboration,
they clearly are sovereignty-enhancing-improving the practical
ability of governments as a group to regulate private actors as a
group.
Diversity of National Circumstances
At the heart of the case against benchmark standards lies the
belief that such standards will be grossly inefficient by over-riding
the fundamental diversity of national preferences and circumstances.
This argument works differently depending on whether the harm is
transboundary/global or local. We begin with the "hard case" of local
harms.
Local Harms
A widely shared view, encapsulated in Nordhaus' "Fundamental
Result," holds that "[for local harms], countries should determine
their policies by balancing local marginal costs and benefits. The
resulting efficient standards or emissions fees will generally be
different in different countries ... Efforts to harmonize policies for
local environmental problems will lead to a decline in potential
economic welfare."
Underlying this view are two widely-shared albeit often implicit
assumptions. First, nations are assumed to have the technical
capacity and will to develop cost-effective standards and incentives
which fulfill treaty commitments and efficiently remedy local harms.
As Nordhaus candidly acknowledges, his Fundamental Result
assumes that "environmental goods are correctly priced internally,"
meaning that costs are fully internalized by national policies. 68 We
have seen that fundamental limitations on national capacity to
evaluate standards, set standards and enforce them renders this
assumption untenable.
A second assumption of the anti-standards argument is a
conceivable cure for the first. It holds that even if the possibility of
government failure to internalize costs (due to lack of capacity or
will) is admitted, that failure is without policy relevance because the
diversity of national circumstances simply does not permit efficient
international standard setting in respect of local harms.69 Applying
international standards notwithstanding this diversity of national
circumstances would be, in the words of one analyst, like "lying down
with Procrustes."7 ° Among the frequently mentioned dissimilarities
of national circumstance are: (1) variations in environmental
assimilative capacity; (2) variations in products or production
processes and marginal cost of controls; (3) variations in levels of
economic development; and (4) variations in political preferences.
This chapter does not hold that these dissimilarities are never
predominant or that benchmark standards are always appropriate.
But it does suggest that such variations should not be presumed to
be dominant and to be correlated with nationality in all cases.
Variations not strongly correlated with nationality can and should
be dealt with by appropriate variegation or tiering of standards, as
is done in national environmental standard-setting schemes.
(1) Variations in assimilative capacity. One major argument
for maximum diversity of standards is the belief that the soil,
terrain, climate and geographic situation of nations varies widely
and that this gives rise to major differences in the capacity of the
environment of various nations to "assimilate" environmental
impacts without lasting harm. Standards harmonization is
objectionable because it would preclude taking account of such
variation. Why should a power plant in Jakarta, whose sulfur dioxide
plume blows out over the Pacific, be subject to the same standard as
a similar facility in Los Angeles?
The answer is that it should not, but that objection assumes that
international standards must be rigidly uniform. It is irrelevant to
the case for tiered international standards as described later.
Ecosystem variations occur within provinces, within nations and
across national boundaries. Significant variations in environmental
impact, as Nordhaus acknowledges, have been mapped in the
immediate vicinity of individual power plants!71 The United States
has a very wide range of industrialization, human exposure scenarios
and ecosystems within its national boundaries. And yet it has a
discrete set of standards, tiered to reflect these variations, e.g.,
higher standards for sources in air quality non-attainment areas or
for sources adjacent to pristine areas; more lenient standards for
sources located in less burdened or sensitive areas. Ecosystems
assuredly vary as do their capacity to assimilate environmental
stresses. But there is no evidence to support the assumption that
such variations correlate strongly with nationality. The assimilative
capacity of the atmosphere in Mexico City is not greater than in
Bangkok. Nor are Mexican lungs more tolerant of carcinogens than
Thai lungs. It will be seen that differing levels of economic
development may support a difference in standards. But putative
differences in human or environmental assimilative capacity do not.
Now it may be argued that ecosystem variation is so wide that
national standards are themselves procrustean. Making standards
international is just another step in the wrong direction of excessive
uniformity. Ideally, so the argument goes, standards for each facility
would be custom-made to reflect the assimilative capacity and
vulnerabilities of its surrounding ecosystem. The problem with this
argument is that it works only in theory. In practice, the
"assimilative capacity" of any ecosystem is virtually impossible to
measure or predict with any precision. The capacity of an ecosystem
to absorb insults from any particular facility depends heavily on the
total number, magnitude and interaction of all combined sources of
stress on the system. These variables may change drastically over
time, leaving an infinitely complicated pattern of pollutant
interactions which cannot be predicted or modelled at the time the
permit for a particular facility is issued. Treating first-come facilities
leniently because the local environment is, at that time, relatively
unburdened means that later facilities have less of an increment of
acceptable degradation available to them. They must over-control
because early comers undercontrolled. On the compliance side, the
control options available to mitigate damage are generally known,
but not infinitely varied. They are normally "lumpy" and take the
form of various technologies or techniques that might be applied to
prevent or clean up pollution (or, in the case of combustion, various
fuels that might be burned) at various costs. The more widely they
are required, the more cheap and efficient they will be for each
facility to install. In the light of these practical realities, standards
for environmental performance are essential, and tiered standards
to reflect coarse gradations of environmental sensitivity make
eminently good sense.
In short, differing assimilative capacities of differing ecosystems
can be used, at most, to argue against rigidly uniform standards at
the national as well as the international level. They do not make a
case against international standards per se.
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(2) Differing marginal costs of control. A related economic
objection, raised by Nordhaus et al., is that marginal costs of a given
level of emissions reduction may vary among different producers.
The objection is that international standards would over-ride these
natural variations and that would be economically inefficient.73 This
argument assumes, however, that marginal costs of unit reductions
are homogeneous within countries, variant between them. The
assumption is entirely without empirical support or plausibility. In
fact, it is far more likely that marginal costs of compliance will vary
among categories of sources within countries-large/small, old/new,
this process or that process-rather than among countries. A paper
mill in Argentina may show a compliance cost structure remarkably
like a paper mill in Michigan, particularly if both apply the same
production process and both are owned by Georgia Pacific. Again, the
proper response to differing marginal costs and benefits of regulation
is tiering of standards by appropriate criteria; not abandoning a
standards approach.
In a perfect world with no uncertainty and no regulatory
transactions costs, each facility and each point source within it would
be subject only to controls that are "custom-made" to equalize exactly
the costs and benefits of controls in that facility located in that
particular environment. We do not inhabit such a world. We never
will. In practice, standards must be set at some level-local, state,
federal, or international-with a recognition that no "fit" will ever be
exact. In view of the high transactions costs and extreme complexity
of the standard-setting process, there is no reason to presume that
decentralized decision-making is always optimal.
(3) Differing levels of economic development. Why should
Bangladesh-whose poorer population is dying from hunger,
malaria, arLd untreated water-be asked to force its electricity
producers to install the latest stack gas scrubber on a coal fired
power plant? This, in stark terms, is the argument against applying
the same standards in poor developing countries as apply in
developed ones.
The argument has a certain rhetorical appeal, but there are
several things wrong with it. First, not all environmental standards
are expensive to implement. Depending on the product or process in
question, there may well exist less ambitious mitigation options that
would realize smaller though still substantial gains at a still lower
cost. The Business Council on Sustainable Development (BCSD) has
concluded that in many cases substantial improvements in
environmental performance can be achieved at a net cost saving. In
these cases, management inaction, in the absence of standards, is
explained by knowledge gaps, inattention, inertia, or a very short
time horizon for planning.
Benchmark standards do not have to be expensive; and they
certainly do not have to be unitary. In cases where high performance
standards are expensive to meet, it may often be possible to design
a lower tier of standards which seek lower levels of environmental
performance at a lower cost. At the same time, an international
standards regime that searches for such a lower tier would stimulate
development or dissemination of inexpensive control technologies
that would meet Bangladesh's needs; or assist Bangladeshi
regulators to in their awareness of technologies or practices in
existence.
Second, it is wrong to assume that lower level of development
means lower benefit from environmental protection. A priori one
might argue the opposite with equal plausibility. The benefits of
pollution control are greater in developing countries-where a large
percentage of the population live in close contact with the
environment and derive their livelihood from it-than in developed
countries where people lead relatively insulated lives. The question
of relative benefits from pollution control is an empirical one, which
must be answered on a case-by-case basis, according to the pollutant
and the sets of affected ecosystems in question.
Third, the differing-levels-of-development line of argument
overlooks that fact that countries, by and large, do not produce
goods. Firms do. It is by no means obvious that a major
multinational firm located in Bangladesh or Indonesia and producing
textile and apparel for export back to the United States or Europe
should be subject to lower environmental standards in those
developing countries.74 The developing country status of Bangladesh
is essentially irrelevant to the determination of the efficient standard
for such a firm.
In general, the choice of efficient standard is far more likely to
turn on the product, the process involved, the cost of complying with
the standard, the ultimate customer, and the size and sophistication
of the producer or facility, than on the level of development of the
country where a facility happens to be located.
(4) Differing values and political preferences. Here is a
variable that presumably changes by country. Differing countries
have differing attitudes on risk, on the value to be placed on human
life and environmental preservation, on the priority to be accorded
to industrialization, and so forth. International standards, it is said,
would ride rough-shod over those preferences.
Such differences in values certainly cannot be ignored on the
ground that they reflect "political choice" problems, or special
interest pressures. Who is to make that judgment? It is reasonable
in the abstract to predict that, other things equal, a highly visible
and widely-inclusive international process is more likely to be merit-
based than the process leading to a national (or sub-national)
standard. In particular cases, however, it is hard to know how one
would prove that a given process was tainted by special interest
pleading and, furthermore, tainted more than a hypothetical
alternative process would have been.
A more fundamental rejoinder to arguments based on diverse
preferences. is that national preferences can change in response to
information. As Haas has documented in detail in the context of the
emerging regime to protect the Mediterranean from land-based
sources of pollution, the values and preferences of various countries
(such as Algeria in his case study) are prone to substantial change as
understanding of environmental problems matures, as knowledge of
available solutions grows, and as experts within national
governments are increasingly vested with decision-making
authority.7 Thus, the prevailing chaotic status quo cannot be
defended on the grounds of differing preferences when those
preferences are themselves likely to evolve significantly as a result
of the standard-setting exercise. At the end of the day, if the country
remains opposed to an international standard it will remain free not
to adopt it. That is the essence of a nonbinding standard.
At the core of the argument for tiered international standards
lies the plausible premise that national capacity for independent
standard setting is limited, that the design of cost-effective
standards is complex and resource intensive, and that a number of
products and agricultural, extractive, or industrial processes, e.g., oil
refining, chemical manufacture, pose a relatively discrete and finite
range of environmental challenges wherever they take place. While
there certainly are some important differences that correlate with
where the plants are located, there also may be important cross-
national similarities in processes, in environmental and health
impacts arising from those processes, and/or in the various technical
and policy options available to mitigate those impacts. In cases
where the similarities are substantial, and the differences can be
reflected in a finite number of discrete tiers, there are important
efficiency and environmental gains to be reaped from international
collaboration in standard setting.76 Indeed, in such cases the
alternative to international standards may be no meaningful and
enforceable standards at all.
How does one identify such cases? Esty argues for a
"jurisdictional matching principle" whereby decisions would be taken
at the level that corresponds to the geographic scope of the physical
harm, although elsewhere in his article he argues for the relevance
of economic or psychic spillovers.77 On this view, local harms would
be regulated at the local level; regional harms at the regional level;
and global harms at the global level. This view, however, effectively
dismisses the possible relevance of capacity constraints and cross-
national similarities of condition, although Esty elsewhere
acknowledges the relevance of these factors. It reiterates the status
quo rejection of internationally coordinated policies addressed to
local harms. If we accept that capacity constraints are or should be
significant and relevant factors in regime design, and that there are
or may be cross-national similarities in local challenges that warrant
coordinated approaches, then one derives a rather different decision
rule. Rather than looking case-by-case at the scope of the externality
at issue, one looks case-by-case at whether there are similarities in
the issues facing regulators. My recommended approach, therefore,
would be to analyze the products and processes having important
environmental and health impacts. The Dutch government, for
example, has identified a number of industries which it calls
"homogeneous" industries, meaning that production processes are
broadly similar across the industry. These might be likely candidates
for early standardization."8 But even so-called heterogeneous
industries might be candidates for tiered and variegated standards
approaches at some point, if the heterogeneity of products and
production processes turns out not to be well-correlated with
nationality. The point is not that tiered standardization by product
or process category should be pursued in every case, but only that it
should not be categorically ruled out.
Global Harms
Are there sufficient cross-national similarities of circumstance
to permit the development of relevant and appropriate benchmark
standards to address transboundary or global harms? Certainly, such
variations of circumstances are not greater for global and
transboundary harms than for local ones; in the case of the receiving
environment, they are less.
Nonetheless, the other sources of variation reviewed in the
context of local harms remain applicable to product or process
standards addressing global harms. For example, new facilities are
likely to be subject to stricter control requirements than existing
facilities; major sources may be more strictly controlled than minor
sources; small, unsophisticated producers cannot be held to the same
costly and stringent requirements as major multinationals;
subsistence goods should not be taxed or regulated as heavily as
luxuries. Again, these are all the same sorts of distinctions as occur
within countries and are taken into account in setting national
standards. International standard setting may expand the relevant
range of variation somewhat, but doubling the number of countries
probably will not double the range of variation. To the extent that
there are similarities in products or production processes across
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countries--again, this is an empirical question-there are efficiencies
to be gained from international collaboration.
The two variables that do correlate with nationality are risk
preference and moral position. Although a harm may be global, it is
likely to affect various countries differently depending on their
location, climate and topography; countries also may vary in their
assessment of the likelihood of that impact, and in the priority
assigned to avoiding it in the context of the other challenges they
face. Developing countries may make a moral claim that developed
countries, having contributed the most to the damage, should pay the
most to clean up the damage.
These arguments, however, will be raised and must be resolved
through persuasion or inducement in the context of any international
regime addressing transboundary harms, whether the norms
contained therein are expressed in the form of aggregate
commitments or benchmark standards. They have been used to claim
special and. differential obligations for developing countries and, by
inclusion, producers in developing countries, in responding to global
harms. In the context of benchmark standards, they support
rejection of rigidly uniform standards, and they comprise an appeal
for a "developing country" tier in standards wherever there is more
than one control option for mitigating harm from a particular
product or source. But they do not constitute a critique of
international standards in principle.
Risk of Downward Harmonization of Standards
Here is the bugaboo that haunts environmental advocates
leading many of them to oppose, or be wary of, "harmonization." It
causes them to insist that any standard emerging from such a
standardization process must be a floor, not a ceiling, for national
standards.
Higher-than-international product standards applied to
imported products are already subject to the trade disciplines of the
WTO Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade and Sanitary and
Phyto-sanitary Standards. These agreements expressly respect the
right of governments to impose higher-than-international standards
to domestic and imported products without discrimination, subject
to certain safeguards against disguised protectionism. Although
environmentalists have expressed concern that these safeguards are
broadly worded and could allow a GATT dispute panel to invalidate
a national standard that legitimately differed from an international
one, I believe that risk is slight under the emerging jurisprudence of
the WTO.7 9
On the other hand, the GATT/WTO offers no recognition of
international PPM standards and has been interpreted, in fact, as
generally prohibiting governments from applying national or
international environmental standards to imported products in
respect of non-product-related PPMs. ° Negotiation of international
PPM standards would not change that. Governments would remain
free, as they are now, to maintain higher-than-international PPM
standards for their own producers; but would be barred, as they are
now, from extending domestic standards to imported goods, unless
and until the GATT is clarified.
While downw4rd harmonization of standards is not a major risk
arising from benchmark standards so long as such standards are
clearly minima, it must be admitted that the benefits of uniformity
are reduced to the extent governments feel the need to establish
higher-than-international standards to meet their own needs. One
way of responding to this concern is simply to ensure that
international standards include a "high performance" tier to
accommodate high standard countries.
Unwieldiness
One of the most fundamental objections to an international
process standards regime is its unwieldiness. If it takes EPA 6 years
to promulgate a single rule setting standards on hazardous air
pollutants, how is the world going to do it in less than 100? And how
would the standard ever be amended to reflect new technologies? The
possibilities for gridlock and ossification seem endless.
The answer is that it should be no harder, and may be easier, for
an international body to enact and revise a standard than for EPA.
Presumably, the international panel would have greater resources
around the table. It would have access to greater expertise and wider
data. And it would not be worried about preparing a record for
judicial review; nor would it be subject to the procedural miasma
imposed by the Administrative Procedure Act.
On the other hand, internationalizing the process may expand
the variety of products or PPMs at issue, and would certainly
increase the range of cultural perspectives around the table. The key
to an effective process is establishing an effective system of
representation that brings expertise and legitimacy to the table
while keeping the numbers manageable (see the discussion below).
In addition, it would be highly advisable to have a neutral, IPCC-like
scientific and technical advisory panel that would do studies, prepare
reports and otherwise advise on the technical and technological
aspects of the process.
Perhaps the best way to keep a perspective on the unwieldiness
issue is to remember the alternative: scores of different states
separately developing, or revising, their own standards. That too is
unwieldy.
Dependence on Trade Sanctions
The debate over "harmonization" of standards has often centered
on whether high standard countries are justified in imposing trade
restrictions-embargoes or countervailing duties-on products of
lower standard countries.81 In fact, critics of international standards
approaches often assume that international standards will be
imposed on other countries through trade sanctions.8 2 That, of
course, is not the issue here. Whatever the merits of allowing
importing countries to impose their own national standards on
imports in the absence or presence of an international standard, the
more fundamental issue addressed by this chapter is whether truly
international product or process standards are efficient, effective and
feasible.8 3
Another common observation among industry and government
delegates to trade and environment fora is that international process
standards are a lousy idea because no one will join them unless they
are forced to by trade sanctions, and trade sanctions for that purpose
are categorically unacceptable.8 4
This point of view is most plausible in respect of costly standards
which have significant competitiveness implications. Consider first
the case of costly standards addressed to local harms. Under this
scenario, the temptations for non-implementation or non-compliance
with such standards are strong, and the economic discomfort
considerable for producers in countries that voluntarily adopt them
while others do not. Trade measures against non-complying goods
will likely be required to persuade nations/producers to join and to
deter widespread holdout behavior that would undermine the
viability of the regime. A heated and complex debate has been waged
over whether trade measures in the form of "eco-countervailing
duties" against environmentally "subsidized" goods from low
standard countries are legitimate or practicable. 5 That debate has
largely subsided, with a clear victory on the ground for free traders
waging the powerful argument that eco-subsidies are not only
theoretically questionable but practically impossible to administer.
With the possible exception of recyclable hazardous waste covered by
the Basel Convention, the trading community will almost certainly
reject any proposal for trade-backed international PPM standards
aimed at addressing local environmental effects confined to the
exporting countries.
Not all international standards addressed to local harm are, or
need be, expensive to comply with, however. Where environmentally
effective, nonbinding standards can be met without ceding a major
competitive advantage to producers in holdout countries, there is
reason to believe they will be widely adopted-if they are technically
proficient. Similar codes of practice and guidelines relating to
occupational safety and health have been put forward by the
International Labour Organisation (ILO) and, as Virginia Leary has
observed, there is general agreement that the codes and guidelines,
in this field, while nonbinding, "have had an important influence on
national laws and practice."86 Properly developed environmental
standards could have the same influence.
This brings us to the case of environmental standards
addressing transboundary or global impacts. Once again, trade
measures are likely to be needed only to uphold standards imposing
significant compliance costs. But where the standard is embodied in
an IEA addressing transboundary or global harms, any categorical
aversion to trade measures is groundless. There is sterling
precedent-CITES, the Montreal Protocol, Basel Convention-for the
employment of trade measures as an essential part of a
comprehensive and widely consensual arrangement addressing
transboundary and global harms. There is no apparent reason why
future product- or process-specific standards deemed essential to
achieving the same or comparable objectives should be assigned a
lesser claim to the support of trade incentives. The GATT should be
clarified so as to expressly permit national trade measures which
restrict imports of goods that fail to conform to international
standards addressing transboundary and global harms, be they
product or process-based.
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Benchmark standards represent, in essence, a middle road
between the course advocated by those who seek upward
harmonization of standards at the highest conceivable level, and
those who advocate no convergence of substantive standards at all.
Contrary to the stereotypical characterization of harmonization
proposals as "Procrustean beds" on which nations will be forced to
lie,"8 benchmark standards as proposed would not be rigid or
uniform. They need not be secretive or undemocratic.
Here is how benchmark standards for production processes
might be developed in practice:
First, concerned governments would choose the environmental
impact to be addressed-either a transboundary or global impact or
a widely shared local concern-and the categories of producing
facilities or activities to be covered by the standard. Examples might
include sus*tainable forestry standards for particular types of forest
(tropical and temperate); high seas fishery practice requirements to
limit by-catch; standards to limit the use of methyl bromide in
particular agricultural applications; standards to limit emissions of
persistent organic pollutant (POPs) from identified applications;
standards to limit emissions of hazardous pollutants from classes or
sub-classes of oil refineries or chemical manufacturing plants;
practice guidelines to eliminate use of CFCs in cleaning computer
circuit boards; and/or industrial pre-treatment standards for the
discharge from identified categories of manufacturing facilities into
municipal water sources.8 9 Attention should focus on environment-
ally significant activities or facilities which are either (1) relatively
large-scale and small in number, or (2) relatively homogeneous or at
least subject to limited nationality-correlated variation.
Second., covered producers would conduct internal audits of key
emissions or other impacts following standardized monitoring and
reporting procedures. 9 The initial impact audit would establish the
baseline for the standard-setting process, identifying what levels of
emissions are forthcoming from which sorts of products or processes.
Subsequent audits of emissions and other aspects of environmental
performance would then provide the basis for standards
improvement and for compliance oversight.9 ISO environmental
management standards and emerging environmental audit
standards provide both precedent and guidance for how such audits
might proceed.
Third, a negotiating group would be convened to develop a draft
standard in consultation with all affected stakeholders not directly
represented in the group. There are several models for how such a
group might be constituted: (1) technical experts drawn from a
variety of disciplines and nationalities, as in the ozone treaty's
technical options committees; (2) governmental representatives
only-the traditional model for international negotiation; (3)
balanced representation of private stakeholders and government
representatives (e.g., ILO and U.S. negotiated rulemaking); or (4)
some hybrid or variation' of the foregoing. Full discussion of the
advantages and disadvantages of each approach is beyond our scope.
Suffice it to say here that the ISO standards process used to develop
international environmental management standards is a model of
sorts, although as Roht-Arriaza observes, a flawed one. It establishes
a precedent for government, industry, and environmental NGO
collaboration in setting international standards for corporate
behavior; but it does not provide for balanced representation in ISO
decision bodies and hence lacks the degree of credibility necessary for
a body charged with developing substantive and enforceable limits.
Fourth, the negotiating group would develop a draft standard
following a consultative and negotiating process similar to that now
employed by ISO. As in the case of national standards, applicable
international standards might be sub-divided to allow variation
according to the nature of the product or process, the age and size of
the facility, the vulnerability of the receiving population or ecosystem
to further impacts (high/medium/low), and/or a forecast of the likely
economic impact of a particular control option on producers or
consumers (high/medium/low). This may sound complicated, but it
actually represents a rough approximation of how standard setting
and permit writing is currently done at the national level: a wide
range of factors and judgment calls enters into the selection of the
standard, but the standards that finally emerge are discrete and
finite in number, representing a discrete and finite range of control
options.
Once the draft standard is issued, there would be a comment
period and then a negotiation to prepare the final version. A
standard would be adopted only when agreed to by a specified
number of countries (or countries representing an agreed proportion
of relevant production and consumption of the product in question).
The standards would be updated periodically by a similar or possibly
abbreviated process.
Under sound standard-setting principles, benchmark standards
generally would prescribe performance levels and would not require
adoption of particular practices. There is always the possibility that
new or previously unexplored processes would emerge which yield
more of one pollutant in exchange for less of another. Like national
standards, international standards would require a variance
procedure, at the national or international level, which would be
implemented based on determinations of environmental equivalence.
Such a procedure could also be used to accommodate reasonable
experimentation with new processes offering the prospect of greater
pollution reduction at less cost. And it could be used to minimize
adaptation costs arising from the existence of national standards
that may be different from, but no less stringent than the
international norm.
As in the U.S. where federal standards are used as benchmarks
for permitting individual facilities, international benchmark
standards would be applied to particular products or facilities either
by national government permit writers, or by individual certifiers
(analogous to permit writers) who would be located within the
country in question but would be directly accountable to the
international regime. Although it is not essential to the scheme, it
will be helpful if certifiers are nationals of the country in question
but have experience with the industry in question and are trained
and certified by a national or international accreditation board. This
will help protect both the integrity and the competence of the
certification process. The International Organization for Standards
(ISO) is already establishing a system for training and accrediting
certifiers who are knowledgeable of particular industries to
implement its environmental management system certification
program.92
Compliance with benchmark standards would be monitored by
government inspectors where available. In addition, compliance
would be overseen by producer self-audits checked by independent
third-party verification, as ISO currently provides for on a volunteer
basis. Substantive standards would require mandatory third-party
certification of the audit-and of compliance with all applicable laws,
regulations and standards-in order to be credible. Here the model,
as Roht-Arriaza observes, is EMAS, the European variant of ISO.93
Beyond monitoring, auditing, and reporting, as Gareth Porter
has observed, a key element of any sectoral standards regime is the
establishment of national or regional centers for technical assistance
in pollution reduction.94 These centers would advise industries or
trade associations on requirements and techniques for monitoring
and reporting emissions. They also would counsel industries on ways
they could meet minimum standards through least-cost or efficiency
enhancing techniques. Porter notes that UNEP has already
established working groups on cleaner production in several
industries, including leather tanning, textiles, solvents, metal
finishing, pulp and paper, and petroleum.95
A further essential ingredient, as always, would be
establishnment of a funding mechanism for the program. In this
instance, it would be used to finance the technical assistance centers,
to facilitate the participation of developing countries in standard
setting and enforcement, and to provide financial assistance to small
and medium-sized enterprises, particularly those in developing
countries, in complying with standards.
The procedure outlined above for developing and overseeing
compliance with benchmark standards is both manageable and not
unprecedented. With a few important adjustments the model can be
understood as an incremental evolution from current or emerging
practice in standards development and compliance oversight.
Conclusion
Benchmark standards are not simple or easy to develop. Neither
are the myriad national standards that are needed to manage the
multiple environmental risks which now menace mankind both
globally and locally. The model proposed is designed to be inclusive,
flexible, capacity-enhancing and trade-promoting. It has been seen
that the approach proposed is workable and not radically new.
If national technical capacity turns out to be as limited in many
countries as it now appears to be, some form of benchmark standards
may turn out to be the only path to effective environmental
protection against both transboundary and global harms.
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